We combine two different theories that are widely used to establish rankings of populations: the theory of ranking methods developed in economic theory and the paired comparison analysis studied in statistics. Given a discipline with a well founded rating function, we present a ranking method for the tournaments of that discipline and discuss some of its properties.
Introduction
When there is a competition among the members of a population, the fundamental problem is to rank these members according to their strength.
1 In certain cases this confrontation takes the form of a tournament in which contestants play against themselves obtaining a certain score in each match. The aim of the tournament is to determine a final ranking after all the matches have been played. Nonetheless, this is not always easy when two or more players have the same final score. The idea behind most of the tie-breaking rules and ranking methods is to determine the strength of a player according to the results obtained in the tournament and the strength of the opponents the player has played against.
Formally, a ranking of a population N , is a complete, reflexive and transitive relation on N . To fix notation, we use the word rating when we have a cardinal ranking, that is, not only do we have an ordering of the contestants, but also a measure of the intensities of the differences among them.
In economic theory an axiomatic approach is taken to determine a ranking of the population N . First, it is assumed that there is a matrix containing the relevant information about the paired results of the different players; this matrix is usually referred to as the tournament matrix. Then, a ranking method is defined as a function that ascribes a ranking to each tournament matrix. Next, the properties of the different methods are studied. Finally, a ranking method, whose properties are suitable for a given discipline, is chosen. To deepen S a n t i a g o d e C o m p o s t A u g u s t , 2 0 0 5 into the economic literature on rankings refer to Rubinstein (1980) , Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) , Amir (2002) , Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) , and Slutzki and Volij (2005) .
When using paired comparison analysis, each player i is assumed to have a strength parameter R i . It is also assumed that there exists a distribution F such that F (R i , R j ) is the probability that i beats j. The objective of paired comparison analysis is to fix a distribution F that properly fits the available data and then, using statistical tools, calculate the most likely values of the strength parameters R i . Once these values are calculated, they may be used to define a rating for each player. To deepen into the basic literature on paired comparisons, refer to Kendall and Smith (1940) , Bradley and Terry (1952) , and David (1988) . Our approach is closer to that in the more recent papers Joe (1990) and Glickman (1999) .
In this paper we consider a discipline with a function F , determined from the data of all the historical confrontations of the players in a population, that describes the underlying random process. Now, assume that we have one more tournament of that discipline and we want to rank the players of that tournament according to their scores. This issue arises naturally in many situations such as sport events, social choice and statistics. The books by David (1988) and Laslier (1997) are two comprehensive texts on the topic. Refer also to the recent paper Slutzki and Volij (2005) where the existing literature is thoroughly revised. In this paper we bring together two widely used ideas. On the one hand, our main ranking method, the recursive performance, is defined using a recursive formula that resembles the Liebowitz-Palmer method (Liebowitz and Palmer, 1984) and other similar methods (Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2004) in economic theory. On the other hand, our recursive formula uses the rating function F , so basic in the paired comparison analysis literature.
The results obtained in this paper can be immediately applied to define new tie-breaking rules for disciplines such as chess and Othello.
2 In our opinion, these new tie-breaking rules improve the existent ones (see Section 3 for details).
We briefly describe the contents of this paper. In Section 2 we present the concept of tournament and comment on the assumptions used throughout this paper. Section 3 is the core of our study. We introduce the so-called recursive performance, we discuss its properties and give examples of tournaments in which it might be applied. Finally, in Section 4 we prove the technical results needed in Section 3.
Tournaments
We have a discipline in which confrontations between the different players of a population take place along time. For such a discipline, there is a rating function F that accurately describes the probabilities associated with the different results of each match between any two given players. This rating function is such that, given two players i and j with strength parameters R i and R j , the probability that i beats j is
3 We refer to the strength parameters R i as ratings. We work within the linear paired comparison model (David, 1988) . More specifically, we assume that there is a strictly increasing continuous distribution function
, that is, the result of a game between any two players depends only on their rating difference. The probability that i beats j goes to 1 as R i − R j S a n t i a g o d e C o m p o s t A u g u s t , 2 0 0 5 grows and the probability that i beats j is positive regardless of the rating difference. Moreover, since F (R i , R j ) = 1 − F (R j , R i ), F l is symmetrically distributed about zero. Also, note that the function F −1 l is well defined. We denote by M k×l the vector space of real k × l matrices. A tournament for a set of n players is a pair (A, S), where A ∈ M n×n is the tournament matrix and S ∈ R n is the vector of scores. The entry A ij denotes the number of confrontations between players i and j and, for each player i, S i is the average of the scores achieved by player i in his confrontations. Since the n players participate in the tournament, each row must have a nonzero entry. We denote by R ∈ R n the vector of ratings of the players in the tournament (A, S).
The result of a confrontation between two players i and j may be not only a win or a loss but any vector (a, b) with a, b ≥ 0, a + b = 1. Thus, going back to the rating function, we may interpret F (R i , R j ) as the expected score of player i when facing player j. Now, we describe the kind of problems that we try to address in this paper. The primitives of our model are a population N , a rating function F , a initial vector of ratings R and a tournament (A, S) among the players of N . We present a ranking and rating method for the tournament in question.
Since the ranking method we define in this paper is anonymous, the labels chosen for indexing the players are irrelevant. Based on this fact, two tournaments that are equal up to labelling are said equivalent. We make this definition precise. Denote by L αβ ∈ M n×n the transposition matrix that swaps the αth and βth entries of a vector. A transposition matrix satisfies L −1 αβ = L αβ and, given another matrix B ∈ M n×n , the product L αβ B is the same matrix B but with rows α and β interchanged. Similarly, BL αβ interchanges columns α and β of B. The group Π n generated by the composition of transposition matrices L αβ is isomorphic to the group of permutations of n elements. We say that two tournaments (A, S) and (
two equivalent tournaments have similar tournament matrices.
A matrix A ∈ M n×n is block diagonal, respectively block anti-diagonal, if
We assume that our tournaments satisfy the following two natural assumptions:
If the tournament matrix A ′ is block diagonal, the tournament has an internal division: there are two disjoint subsets of players such that none of the players of one set has played against anyone of the other set. This is a standard assumption in the ranking's literature since each block may be considered as the matrix of an independent tournament.
A2. The tournament (A, S) is not equivalent to a tournament
If A ′ is block anti-diagonal, the tournament may be considered as a team-tournament. There are two disjoint subsets (teams) such that the players of each team have played only against the players of the other, but not among themselves. Although similar to A1, this property is more subtle and has different implications. In this case, in order to calculate the strength of the players of one team, we need the strength of the players of the other team that can only be calculated using the strength of the players in the first team. This cyclic S a n t i a g o d e C o m p o s t A u g u s t , 2 0 0 5 feature of team-tournaments is the reason why, if A2 is not met, the iterative method we describe below does not necessarily converge.
Recursive Performance
The objective of this section is to formally introduce the recursive performance and discuss some of its properties. Refer to Section 4 for the technical results and its corresponding proofs.
Let (A, S) be a tournament. For each player i, let m
A ik denote the number of matches played by i. We define
is the number of confrontations between i and j divided by the total number of matches played by i.
Let (A, S) be a tournament with S ∈ (0, 1) n . Let R ∈ R n be the vector of initial ratings and let F l be the distribution of the linear paired comparison model. The vector of performances P ∈ R n is defined as
where
Note that (ĀR) i coincides with the average rating of the opponents of player i. Hence, the performance of player i is the unique rating P i such that F (P i , (ĀR) i ) = S i . In fact, S i is i's expected score against a player of rating (ĀR) i if and only if i has a rating P i . This justifies the name performance. The assumption S ∈ (0, 1) n is needed in order to define the vector of performances correctly, but this situation holds in most tournaments. Indeed, the performance ranking method is already used as a tie breaking rule for chess tournaments. The idea of this method is to use the strengths of the opponents of the players to define the rankings. Note that the vector R is the "historical" strength of the players whereas the vector C is, essentially, the score of each player in the tournament. Hence, P measures the results of a player in relation to the strength of his opponents. . Hence, the performance of a player in a tournament is P i = (ĀR) i − 400 log 10 (1/S i − 1), that is, the average of the Elos of his opponents plus a correcting factor depending on the percentage of points achieved by the player. Indeed, the performance is one of the tie-breaking rules recommended by the FIDE.
Note that the vector C depends crucially on the rating function F and, although our notation does not make this dependence explicit, the rating function keeps being an essential element of this paper.
The ranking associated with the vector of performances is not a bad ranking for the tournament, but it heavily depends on the initial ratings R 1 , . . . , R n . The latter measure the historical strength of the players, which might be different from the strength exhibited by the players in the tournament. Moreover, in the paired comparison literature these ratings are often calculated using the method of maximum likelihood, and thus, they are subject to statistical errors.
In this paper we develop the idea underlying the definition of the vector of performances to define a rating for a given tournament. Since the performance is a better indicator of the strength of a player in the given tournament than his initial rating, it is natural to calculate a new performance replacing the initial ratings by the vector of performances. This suggests the iterative method P (0) := P (=ĀR + C), P (l+1) :=ĀP (l) + C. Unfortunately, this S a n t i a g o d e C o m p o s t A u g u s t , 2 0 0 5 method does not necessarily converge. However, this problem can be solved by introducing a readjustment that does not change the ranking proposed at each intermediate step.
Let e ∈ R n be the vector e = (1, . . . , 1). Consider the following rescaling of C,
which we discuss below. We define the iterated performance as the iterative method
At each step, this iterative method gives the same rating as the previous one up to a constant proportional to e and hence, the two proposed rankings are always the same. This is proved in the following lemma.
Proof. Since by definition ofĀ,Āe = e, the result follows by an induction argument.
In Section 4 we prove that, under our assumptions, the iterated performance converges. More specifically, we have Theorem 2. Let (A, S) be a tournament satisfying assumptions A1 and A2 and such that S ∈ (0, 1) n . Let R ∈ R n be a vector of ratings and F l the distribution of the linear paired comparison model. Then the iterated performance converges.
By Lemma 1, ifP
(l) converges then
This justifies the definition ofĈ.
The limit of the iterated performance,P := lim l→∞P (l) , is called the recursive performance. Taking limits in the equalityP (l) =ĀP (l−1) +Ĉ, we get thatP is a solution of the linear system (I −Ā)x =Ĉ,
where I ∈ M n×n is the identity matrix. If A1 holds, by Theorem 3 (iii) below the matrix I −Ā has rank n − 1. Then, sinceĀe = e, the whole set of solutions of (1) is given bŷ P + span{e}. The different solutions of (1) arise from different initial vectors of ratings R.
It is important to note that all the solutions propose the same ranking. Following the previous discussion, even if A2 does not hold, we can unambiguously associate a ranking to each linear system (1) as far as A1 is met.
Example 2. An ideal chess-like tournament is a tournament in which all the players play the same number of rounds, say r.
4 Because of this feature, for an ideal chess-like tournament (A, S) we have M A = rI and hence,Ā = A/r.
In particular, in an ideal chess-like tournament we have iP (l) i = i R i . This shows that, usingĈ instead of C, we adjust the vectors after each iteration to ensure that the sum of the ratings after each step remains constant. In an ideal tournament we may interpret the average of the components of R as an indicator of the average strength of the tournament. In each iteration our method proposes a way to divide the total strength of the tournament among the players, that is, by working withĈ instead of C, we avoid inflation or deflation in the vectors of iterated performances.
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Since the recursive performance is the limit of such vectors, it also provides a way of dividing the total strength of the tournament among the players. In a general tournament, a similar property holds, but in this case the average strength of the tournament is calculated as a weighted average (by the m A i 's) of the components of R. Example 3. A round-robin tournament (A, S) is a tournament in which all the players have played against each other the same number of times, that is,Ā ij = 1/(n − 1) if i = j and A ii = 0. The ranking proposed by the recursive performance in a round-robin tournament coincides with the ranking proposed by the scores. Let x be a solution of (1). Then, the latter follows from the equalityĈ i −Ĉ j = x i − k =i
This is not surprising since the ranking proposed by the recursive performance uses both the scores of the players and the scores of the opponents, but all the players have the same opponents.
5

Discussion of the Recursive Performance Ranking Method
We present some nice properties of the recursive performance.
• The recursive performance ranking method does not depend on the initial vector of ratings since all the solutions of (1) propose the same ranking.
• The recursive performance ranking can be unambiguously calculated for tournaments in which there are unrated players (players with no historical results). As a consequence of the previous point, if there is an unrated player, we can assign him an arbitrarily chosen rating and this election does not affect the final ranking.
• If the initial vector of ratings coincides with the vector of recursive performances, then the vector of performances is the vector of recursive performances up to a translation by a vector proportional to e. In other words, the iterative methodP
• The recursive performance proposes a way to divide the weighted total strength of the tournament among the players. Therefore, when used as a rating method, there is neither inflation nor deflation with respect to the initial ratings.
We would like to emphasize the similarities between the recursive performance and some of the ranking methods that have already been studied in economic theory. In Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) , the authors study several iterative methods based in the one proposed in Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) . The idea of these methods is very close to ours; at step l, the l-iterated ranking vector is used to obtain the (l + 1)-iterated ranking vector. Also, the limit of each method may be calculated as the solution of a linear system.
Mathematical results
In this section we prove the technical results we have used throughout Section 3. Although these results are stated for tournaments, the vector of scores plays no role in the proofs and thus the theorems may be written just in terms of linear algebra. We follow Ciarlet (1989) .
A linear iterated method is convergent if and only if the eigenvalues of the corresponding matrix are, in absolute value, less than 1. For any tournament (A, S) we haveĀe = e and S a n t i a g o d e C o m p o s t A u g u s t , 2 0 0 5 thus 1 is an eigenvalue ofĀ. In this section we prove that, under the assumptions A1 and A2, the iterated performance restricts to a vector subspace where the absolute values of the eigenvalues ofĀ are less than 1, and hence the method converges.
Let (A, S) be a tournament. For each v, w ∈ R n , we define v, w :
is a diagonal matrix and m A i > 0 for all i, ·, · is an inner product in R n , which generalizes the Euclidean inner product. The former, which depends on the tournament, is referred to as the inner product associated with (A, S).
If (A, S) is a tournament, then A is a symmetric matrix butĀ is not symmetric in general. However, there is a kind of symmetry inĀ, this is,Ā ij = 0 if and only ifĀ ji = 0. Motivated by this fact, we say that two matrices D ∈ M k×l and E ∈ M l×k are nulltranspose if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and each j ∈ {1, . . . Theorem 3. Let (A, S) be a tournament and ·, · its associated inner product. Then
The matrixĀ is self-adjoint with respect to ·, · . Moreover, it is diagonalizable, its eigenvalues are real and the eigenspaces are orthogonal with respect to ·, · .
(ii) If λ is an eigenvalue ofĀ, then |λ| ≤ 1.
(iii) (A, S) satisfies A1 if and only if the multiplicity of the eigenvalue 1 is one.
(iv) (A, S) satisfies A2 if and only if −1 is not an eigenvalue ofĀ.
Proof. Let (A, S) and (A ′ , S ′ ) be equivalent tournaments. Then, there exists
′ are similar and their eigenvalue structure is the same. Therefore, we may make, without loss of generality, any assumption regarding the ordering of the indices. We also recall that A ij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For each k ∈ N, e k ∈ R k denotes the vector e k = (1, . . . , 1). Note that e n = e.
Claim (i): Since
The second part follows from the spectral theorem. Claim (ii): The matrix norm · ∞ is defined as B ∞ := max i∈{1,...,n} n j=1 |B ij | for any B ∈ M n×n . By definition we have Ā ∞ = 1 and hence (ii) follows from (Ciarlet, 1989, Theorem 1.4-3) .
Claim (iii): Assume that (A, S) does not satisfy A1. Then,Ā may be written as
Hence,Ā(e k |0) = (e k |0) andĀ(0|e l ) = (0|e l ). Thus, 1 has multiplicity at least 2. Conversely, assume that 1 has multiplicity greater than one. Then, sinceĀ is diagonalizable there exists v ∈ R n , linearly independent from e, such thatĀv = v. Assume that v 1 = 1 and that the components of v are decreasingly ordered, that is, v i ≥ v j for i > j. Let k ∈ N be such that v k = 1 and v k+1 < 1. Since v and e are linearly independent, k < n andĀ may be decomposed as
Now, if E has a nonzero row, for instance row i, we get
S a n t i a g o d e C o m p o s t A u g u s t , 2 0 0 5 contradiction. This proves E = 0 and E nt = 0, which is a contradiction with A1. Claim (iv): Assume (A, S) does not satisfy A2. Then we may writeĀ as
Hence,Ā(e k | − e l ) = −(e k | − e l ) and −1 is an eigenvalue ofĀ. Conversely, assume that −1 is an eigenvalue ofĀ. Let v ∈ R n be such thatĀv = −v and 1 = v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ · · · ≥ v n ≥ −1. Again, there exists k ∈ N, k < n such that v k = 1 and v k+1 < 1. Hence,Ā may be decomposed as in (2).
We show that D 1 = 0. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Since n j=1Ā ij = 1, we have
Hence, k j=1Ā ij ≤ 0. SinceĀ ij ≥ 0, the ith row of D 1 is zero. Therefore, D 1 = 0. Note that v n = −1 since, otherwise, taking i ∈ {1, . . . , k} we get −1 = −v i = (Āv) i = n j=k+1Ā ij v j > −1. Let l ∈ N be such that v n−l > −1 and v j = −1 for j ≥ n − l. Clearly, l > 0. Then, we may further decomposeĀ as
and E 2 ∈ M k×l .
If k + l = n, then this second decomposition is trivial (E = E 2 and D 2 = D 23 ). Otherwise, we claim that E 1 = 0. If the ith row of E 1 is nonzero, then there is j ∈ {k+1, . . . , n−l} such that v j > −1. Proof. Let v ∈ R n . By Theorem 3 there exists a basis of eigenvectors {w 1 = e, w 2 , . . . , w n }, orthogonal with respect to the inner product associated with (A, S), which we denote by ·, · . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let λ i be the eigenvalue associated with w i . Now, it suffices to show that (lim l→∞Ā l )v = ( 1 tr M A ee t M A )v for all v ∈ R n . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have (lim l→∞Ā l )v, w i = lim l→∞ v,Ā l w i = (lim l→∞ λ l i ) v, w i . Since λ 1 = 1 and |λ i | < 1 for each i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, we get (lim l→∞Ā l )v = ( v, e / e, e )e. By definition of ·, · , we have e, e = tr M A and v, e = e t M A v, from where the result follows.
